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CLAIMS OF CONSCIENCE, CLAIMS OF
COMIJNITY
CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING THE
SPACE BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE. By Robert K. Vischer.
Cambridge University Press. 2010.
GERALD J. RUSSELLOt
INTRODUCTION
American legal scholarship and political debate have often
centered on the clash between individual self-understanding and
government power. The right of conscience-to define one's
beliefs and to act on those beliefs in public and private spheres-
has classically been understood as presenting a claim against
state power. But the law has also recognized instances in which
the community can assert claims, including claims of common
beliefs, upon the individual desires of its citizens. A dispute then
usually gets resolved through either invocation of right as a
"trump" which ends the debate, or the state prevails in the name
of a basic common good, such as equality, to overrule the
individual right. For example, in Minersuille School District v.
Gobitis, the Supreme Court ruled that a statute requiring a
public pledge of allegiance was constitutional and enforceable
against those whose religious beliefs prohibited them from
making the pledge,' while in West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette, the Court reversed itself, finding that
requiring such a pledge would violate "individual freedom of
mind."2
In his book, Robert Vischer, a professor at St. Thomas
University School of Law, argues that this traditional
understanding of how to understand and resolve rights claims is
J.D., New York University School of Law.
1 310 U.S. 586, 599-600 (1940), overruled by W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
2 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637, 642.
355
JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 49:355
becoming less helpful in light of new currents in law and society.
His thesis in Conscience and the Common Good ("Conscience") is,
Increasingly, the individual claiming conscience is opposed not
by state power, but by the similarly conscience-driven claims of
nonstate entities. Few of us would dispute the notion that
liberty of conscience is an essential feature of the political order,
but that broad consensus has proved to be of little help in
resolving an expanding range of disputes involving conscience.3
These disputes range across a variety of disciplines and issues,
including whether pharmacies-or individual pharmacists within
a pharmacy-can refuse to provide prescriptions of
contraceptives, whether voluntary associations can control the
composition of their membership, whether a corporation can use
its assets to pursue social or ethical values rather than profits,
and the internal workings of family relationships. The
implications of these new conscience-driven conflicts have been
largely unacknowledged in court decisions and legislation.
Rather than recognize the "moral marketplace" in which
different actors in the public sphere use their conscience to
determine their conduct, courts have instead impressed a
uniform view based on non-conscience concepts, such as equality,
or have resorted simply to the language of individual rights. But
this resort to "rights talk"4 is generally inapposite, because the
central issue in these disputes is no longer whether state power
infringes on the exercise of conscience-such as the claims of
"conscientious objectors"' to oppose the Vietnam-era military
draft'-but rather whose conscience claim is recognized by state
power, and indeed whether the state should intervene at all.
I. THE MEANING OF CONSCIENCE
But what is conscience? In two early chapters, Vischer
explains the development of the notion of conscience in law and,
more broadly, in Western thought. Conscience has several
characteristics relevant to Vischer's inquiry: First, it is
relational-that is, conscience necessarily involves the
application of belief that results in action. That belief is itself
3 ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD 2 (2010).
4 See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 7-9 (1991).
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 164 (1965).




based on "moral claims originating outside" of the individual
conscience, as Vischer's analysis of the objector cases of the 1960s
and 1970s makes clear.7 Because of this relational dimension to
conscience, its assertion cannot be simply a "black box" that
closes off debate.8 The recognition of moral claims that spur
decisions based on a conscientious application of those claims
should allow for further discussion, analysis, and ultimately
judgment.
Further, conscience requires the use of judgment in facts
about the world and relies necessarily on external constraints or
commands. These need not be religious commands, but
nevertheless strongly held beliefs that relate to the world are the
root of conscience and allow such claims to be a "path of dialogue"
rather than a "path of isolation."9 For the law, that presents a
difficulty, because not every action that is conscience driven must
be legal; yet the law must nevertheless distinguish among
appropriate and inappropriate expressions of conscience.10
Vischer then spends a chapter tracing both of these
characteristics of conscience, through the Patristics,
Scholasticism, the Reformation, and the Enlightenment, before
arriving at our own time in the development of narratives of
identity by Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre, among
others." In the Western view, conscience is not fixed or static: It
is a "dialogue with the will" that allows us, among other things,
to communicate our moral convictions to others in the world; but
it also "facilitates personal coherence by bringing ... everyday
decision making into alignment with ... overarching values and
priorities."12
Finally, conscience is related to, but not the same as,
religious liberty. The freedom to worship freely is a subset of
conscience, but one that naturally has been privileged over other
types of conscience-until recently." The Protestant dissenters
who immigrated to the colonies and ultimately founded the
See VISCHER, supra note 3, at 23.
See id. at 22-23.
* See id. at 22.
10 See id. at 23.
n See id. at 48-72. See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY
IN MORAL THEORY (3d ed. 2007); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE
MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY (1989).
12 See VISCHER, supra note 3, at 71-72.
" See id. at 36.
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United States viewed conscience as a relationship between the
individual and God, a relationship that no power-ecclesial or
political-could mediate.14 That basic protection has now evolved
into a more general protection of deeply-held beliefs." Yet, as
Vischer notes, religious liberty also presents a threat to secular
assertions of conscience: Thus, Establishment Clause
jurisprudence has paradoxically treated religious conduct-as
opposed to belief-as sometimes worth restricting in the name of
public goods, even though enshrining liberty of conscience does
not have the same provocative resonance to some as upholding
laws that may seem to "establish" religion. 1 6
II. MARKET ACTOR AND MARKET UMPIRE
Once Vischer lays out the intellectual foundation for his
understanding of conscience, he sets out to review the place of
conscience in different legal settings in a section titled
"Implications."17  These cases do not confront the Gobitis
conundrum, in which national symbols of unity clash with the
beliefs that unity is meant to protect. Rather, the newer cases
change the government's role from market umpire-adjudicating
numerous conscience claims but recognizing a pluralist moral
marketplace-to market actor-itself expressing some social or
moral norm.'8  These different facets of state power, Vischer
argues, need to be kept separate and, on this topic, Vischer
devotes chapters to pharmacies, corporations, voluntary
associations, corporations, the legal profession, and the family. 9
Acknowledging that the state can be a moral actor recognizes
that it has a legitimate interest in promoting common values.
Yet that role must be circumscribed in many cases by a
preference for the state's acting merely as moral umpire,
allowing multiple social and community networks and their
attendant moral claims to flourish in the marketplace. Relying
" See id. at 34.
* See generally id. at 39-43.
16 See id. at 40-43; see also Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990)
("We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from
compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to
regulate.").
See generally VISCHER, supra note 3, at 9, 123.
18 See id. at 6-8.
19 See id. at 10-11, 103.
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on the work of communitarian political theorists such as Michael
Walzer, Vischer sees a correlation between maintaining the
common good and the notion of state restraint:
Viewed from the perspective of the common good, state
deference to conscience does not simply represent a laissez-faire
judgment that individual liberty should be maximized for its
own sake. A robust liberty of conscience actually bolsters the
type of decentralized social bonding that has been lauded as a
hallmark of American life ....
We are not atomistic individuals, asserting rights in a social
vacuum. Rather, we are citizens embedded in a collection of
diverse communities. State action should allow these
communities to express themselves and their claims in
accordance with their beliefs.2 1
Vischer invokes a number of principles, such as subsidiarity
and "sphere sovereignty,"2 2 to flesh out his conception of the role
of the state.2 3 Subsidiarity, as it has been used in Catholic social
thought and by political bodies such as the European Union,
holds that problems should be dealt with by the social or political
body of the smallest relevant size and closest connection to the
community. 24 This principle, therefore, expresses a preference
for non-governmental actors first and smaller government actors
second: It "pushes back against the temptation to view the
individual as a decontextualized rational agent by reminding us
that the human person is, above all, relational."25 Sphere
sovereignty, derived from the work of nineteenth-century
Protestant pastor Abraham Kuyper, envisions different realms of
authority, or spheres, accorded to different groups such as
political units, voluntary associations, or churches.26 These
different spheres do not derive their power or authority from the
state, but operate on their own within their respective area of
20 Id. at 102.
21 See id. at 103.
22 Id. at 106 (internal quotation marks omitted).
23 See id. at 104-10.
24 Id. at 105-06. Subsidiarity was first annunciated as a Catholic social principle
by Pope Pius XI. See POPE Pius XI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER QUADRAGESIMO ANNO 79
(1931), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/pius-xi/encyclicals/documents/
hfp-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-annoen.html.
25 See VISCHER, supra note 3, at 105.
2 Id. at 106; see also ABRAHAM KUYPER, SPHERE SOVEREIGNTY (1880), reprinted
in ABRAHAM KuYPER: A CENTENNIAL READER 461, 467 (James D. Bratt ed., 1998).
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authority.2 7 While the boundaries of the different spheres are
permeable, the concept-that a society should be ordered "around
individuals and the communities to which they commit
themselves"-is foundational for Vischer.2 8
The state cannot always be neutral, of course. Certain basic
common goods-such as security and basic social justice-cannot
be ensured when the state simply backs out of the public square.
In these circumstances, the state acts as a moral agent rather
than a mere moral umpire. As a moral agent, the state can
assert its own moral views and inject them into the marketplace.
But this conduct must be tempered. For example, equality is a
common value, yet the furtherance of that value need not result
in a top-down imposition of obligations on private actors. Only
when individuals cannot meaningfully access the good sought to
be achieved should the state step in and mandate access. In
Vischer's words:
[T]he state's commitment to equality need not preclude the
partiality that invariably arises in meaningful human
relationships... . [T]he state should focus its equality
initiatives on ensuring access to goods and services, not on
enshrining equality as a nonnegotiable requirement for
marketplace participation. When the market is not providing
access, state intervention may be appropriate. 29
Thus, in analyzing the "pharmacy wars," Vischer is sensitive
to questions of access and choice: To demand that all pharmacies
provide contraception, for example, when a consumer has
multiple options, elevates equality of access at the expense of a
legitimate diversity of opinion and expression of moral values.30
The determination of such a demand, however, may be different
in an area without such ready access. 3 1 Yet the recent laws in
California and New York that require religious hospitals to pay
for contraceptives as part of their health insurance coverage
hinder, rather than promote, conscience because they
simplistically "favor the individual in any contest against group
27 VISCHER, supra note 3, at 106; see also KUYPER, supra note 26, at 468.
28 See VISCHER, supra note 3, at 109.
29 Id. at 119.
20 See id. at 151.
31 See id. at 172.
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authority" and in doing so fail to recognize "the organization's
interest in serving as a communal embodiment of a distinctive
set of beliefs."32
Individuals within an organization may have different
beliefs-even beliefs that conflict with the overarching purposes
of the organization-yet that should not obligate the organization
to defer to those beliefs. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale provides a
stark example.33  The Boy Scouts of America's (the "Scouts")
belief that scouting was inconsistent with a scoutmaster's
homosexuality collided with Dale's fundamental understanding
of himself as a person. 34 The Court needed to determine whether
to recognize the Scouts' beliefs as an institution, or to let
individual rights trump that institutional understanding.35
Vischer counsels for deference to associational expression.
The state, within reasonable limits, should not impinge on those
beliefs in the pursuit of its own agenda.36 This deference includes
providing public funding to organizations that espouse beliefs
different than the state's so long as those beliefs do not limit the
services the organizations provide.3 ' For example, the Salvation
Army may express an institutional identity rooted in its
Christian belief, but it may not receive public funding if
assenting to that belief is a precondition for receiving its
38services.
The state may take an even more active role in the moral
marketplace. It may set up its own programs or institutions to
express its opposition to the beliefs of other organizations or
groups-for example, it may establish an adoption agency that
places children with same-sex couples, even if religious agencies
will not.39 What the state may not do is diminish that group's
ability to contribute to the moral or cultural discourse.40
32 See id. at 151.
33 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
1 See id. at 650-53.
3 See id. at 659-60.
36 See VISCHER, supra note 3, at 103, 152-54.
37 See id. at 145-46.
38 See id. at 145.
3 See id. at 150.
40 See id. at 151.
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CONCLUSION
Vischer's vision of conscience and the role of the state in
protecting its legitimate exercise is not rooted in the simplistic
protection of "rights" against oppressive communities. Rather,
he proposes a rich account of how beliefs are expressed in actual
life, through expressive associations and the relational context in
which persons express themselves. Conscience is an implicit
critique of the liberal school of jurisprudence represented by
figures such as Ronald Dworkin. Indeed, Vischer's analysis
explains why Dworkin's own argument that rights should trump
associational expression is ultimately unworkable.4 1 Like David
Tubbs's recent book on liberalism, Conscience highlights the
relative poverty of liberal discourse in confronting rights claims
in a pluralist society-putatively its greatest strength-and
proposes a more flexible and principled alternative.42
4 See Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153, 153
(Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984) ("Rights are best understood as trumps over some
background justification for political decisions that state[] a goal for the community
as a whole.").
42 See generally DAVID L. TUBBS, FREEDOM'S ORPHANS: CONTEMPORARY
LIBERALISM AND THE FATE OF AMERICAN CHILDREN (2007).
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